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Abstract
This paper attempts to study the usage of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism
and to explain its patterns across different regimes and decades, using a unified theoretical
model. This study first explores the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling
in determining countries’ incentives to block/appeal a panel report under the GATT/WTO
regime. The model is able to explain the surge in blocking incidence during the 1980s over
the preceding GATT years and the immense frequency at which the new appellate procedure
under the WTO is invoked. Furthermore, a two-sided asymmetric information framework is
used to study the effects of political power on countries’ incentives to use, and interactions in
using, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It is shown that the magnitude of the
political cost, relative to the potential benefit that the complainant stands to gain when using
this mechanism, determines the pattern of filing activity and the frequency of various procedural
outcomes. This result, when confronted with the statistics on disputes in different decades of the
GATT regime, provides an indicator of how well the dispute procedure has worked during various
decades, in terms of how much this procedure has been subject to potential power politics.
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1 Introduction
Since its inception in 1947, the GATT has evolved into a comprehensive framework of international
trade laws as it exists today under the WTO. The relative effectiveness of the GATT/WTO legal
system has very much hinged upon its dispute settlement mechanism. This procedure allows
member countries to challenge other member countries’ questionable trade measures in respect
to the GATT/WTO agreements. Thus it has worked as a mutual surveillance and enforcement
system of the GATT/WTO. Beginning with meager treaty clauses, this mechanism was elaborated
considerably during GATT’s nearly five-decade history. However, it was not until the establishment
of the WTO in 1995 that the current procedure was adopted and fundamentally changed the nature
of dispute settlement under the GATT/WTO.
One general problem that had overshadowed the dispute procedure under the GATT regime was
the customary practice of requiring all decisions to be made by consensus. The defending party, by
raising objection to consensus, could delay or block the procedure from moving forward, the most
serious problem being the potential of the defending country to block an adverse “panel” report.
The practice was established under the GATT that a “panel” of experts would be established to
hear and rule on a dispute if a bilateral settlement could not be reached between the disputing
parties. However, because only the “Contracting Parties” (the member countries) had the power
to decide on a matter, a panel report had to be adopted or approved by the Contracting Parties
before its rulings became binding. In the face of an adverse panel ruling, the defending party could
potentially block the report and avoid implementation of panel’s recommendations. Intriguing as
it might seem, losing parties, in spite of their veto power, did not block panel reports as often as
one might think. During the 1950s–1970s, only one out of 41 panel rulings was blocked.1 However,
the blocking problem became more conspicuous during the 1980s when ten out of 47 panel reports
were blocked. Presumably because of international diplomatic pressure or considerations of future
disputes, countries did not opt to veto a panel report unless it was really necessary.
In 1995, the WTO was established, and the new dispute procedure under the WTO altered
several features of the previous GATT mechanism. The most significant was the removal of the
consensus rule for panel adoption and hence the elimination of the blocking problem. A panel report
1For more details on the data, see Table 1.
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will be deemed automatically adopted. To guard against possible legal errors that may occur at
the panel stage, however, a new appellate procedure was created instead. The panel report can
be appealed by either one of the disputing parties. If appealed, the dispute will proceed to an
appellate panel, whose judgment will be final and likewise adopted automatically unless there is a
consensus against adoption. Thus, the presumption is reversed, and blocking a panel report has
become virtually impossible. In the six years’ operation of the new WTO during 1995–2000, this
new appellate procedure has been invoked at an immense frequency: 78% of panel rulings were
appealed.2
Another, less explicit, issue about the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the poten-
tial for economic and political power to influence countries’ decisions as they consider confronting
another country over its questionable measures. A small country might worry that the support from
or benefit of maintaining an amicable relationship with a powerful country would be abated if it
chooses to litigate and bring the dispute into the public eye. During the dispute settlement process,
this political consideration might also affect countries’ ability to extract a bilateral settlement, and
influence countries’ decisions to continue litigation or give up. Depending on the effectiveness and
the international acceptance of using the GATT/WTO procedure to resolve trade conflicts, power
politics might have intervened in this international legal system to a greater or lesser degree. The
data on dispute cases under the GATT regime during the 1950s–1980s showed a varied pattern in
the number of filed complaints and their procedural outcomes across different decades. One possi-
ble indication of the degree of power politics at play is the proportion of withdrawn cases. In the
1950s, 53 trade disputes were brought under the GATT legal system, ten of which were withdrawn.
In the 1960s, the system basically fell into a void. Merely seven times was the dispute settlement
procedure invoked, and no complaints were withdrawn. In the 1970s, the legal activities seemed
to thrive again with 32 new cases filed and five of them withdrawn. This momentum continued
into the 1980s when we witnessed a surge in both litigation (115 complaints) and withdrawals (40
cases).3 The pattern in the data corresponded to some interesting evolution and movements in
these decades, as will be documented below, which might have affected countries’ interests and
political costs in using this system.
2Ibid.
3For more details on the data, see Table 2.
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In this paper, the goal is to develop a unified theoretical model to explain the stylized facts
observed across different decades of the GATT/WTO regimes. How can we explain the surge in the
blocking incidence during the 1980s, and what were the costs and benefits disputants might face
when they decided to block an adverse panel ruling? Why has the new appellate procedure under
the WTO been invoked at such a high frequency, and has the new appellate procedure altered
the disputants’ incentive structure to challenge a panel ruling? Furthermore, is there a systematic
way in which we can explain the pattern of filing activity and withdrawal incidence across different
decades of the GATT regime? Theoretically, can we map the characteristics of these decades into
an underlying variable that in turn will determine the pattern of filing activity and the frequency
of various procedural outcomes?
A considerable number of studies on the GATT and WTO dispute settlement mechanisms has
developed in the areas of law4 and political science.5 Nevertheless, a short economics literature
exists that attempts to explain the operation of this international litigation procedure.6 Bu¨tler and
Hauser (2000) was the first theoretical paper that systematically investigated this mechanism from
an economic perspective. However, Bu¨tler and Hauser (2000) focused mainly on the new WTO
dispute settlement procedure. Therefore, the incentives and interactions of countries in using the
dispute procedure under the GATT regime were left largely unaccounted for. Secondly, Bu¨tler and
Hauser (2000)’s theoretical model maintained a complete information framework and, accordingly,
only cases with positive expected payoff from panel proceedings would be filed. With this setup,
we can not explain the withdrawn or abandoned cases that exist in the data.
In a related literature, tremendous advancement has been made in the economic analysis of
“civil” legal disputes. A comprehensive review of this literature was provided by Cooter and Ru-
binfeld (1989). Most of the works in this literature, however, have employed the assumption that
the expected return from a trial to the plaintiff is positive. This assumption effectively excludes the
possibility that a plaintiff might drop the action after bringing a suit and quite drastically reduces
the strategic possibilities for the plaintiff. This literature includes a series of papers on settlement
4See, for example, Hudec (1993, 1999), Jackson (1997, 2000), and Park and Umbricht (2001).
5See, for example, Busch (2000) for an empirical investigation of countries’ decisions to settle or to continue
litigation under the GATT procedure.
6In an empirical paper, Horn et al. (1999) investigated whether the WTO Dispute Settlement system is biased
against smaller and poorer countries. They concluded that the diversity and value of exports as well as legal capacities
could explain the dispute pattern fairly well.
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decisions by Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986) with one-sided asymmetric infor-
mation, and Schweizer (1989) and Daughety and Reinganum (1994) with two-sided asymmetric
information. P’ng (1983), Nalebuff (1987), and Bebchuk (1988) are a few exceptions. Using Be-
bchuk (1988)’s terminology, they allow the possibilities of a negative-expected-value (NEV) suit and
the outcome that a suit might be withdrawn or dropped if a settlement fails. These three papers
have in common the fact that there exists one-sided asymmetric information, but they differ in the
side which owns private information and/or which proposes the settlement offer. These three mod-
els are not so satisfactory in terms of explaining withdrawn suits, however, because upon closer
inspection, the “withdrawal” outcome in these models either does not occur in the equilibrium
(Nalebuff, 1987), or it occurs in the equilibrium only because no cost is incurred by the plaintiff
by filing and then withdrawing a suit (P’ng, 1983; Bebchuk, 1988). The “withdrawal” equilibrium
outcome vanishes if we attach some litigation cost to such a strategy by the plaintiff.7
To explore the effects of power politics, this study allows for potential litigation costs that the
complainant has to incur by bringing a dispute under the GATT/WTO procedure. The potential
litigation costs include possible international political costs that result from an aggravated inter-
national relationship with the defending country. For example, the cost can be a loss of existing
financial aid or preferential treatment provided by the defending country, or damage to the prospect
of mutual cooperation between the countries in commerce or in politics. On the other hand, a gov-
ernment usually brings a case under the GATT/WTO in response to a demand from a domestic
7In Nalebuff (1987), the defendant owns private information which bears on the expected outcome of a trial.
Initially, the plaintiff views his suit as having positive expected value, but he might be required to revise downward
his estimate of the expected value of going to trial if his proposed settlement demand is rejected. Nalebuff (1987)
shows that, in equilibrium, the plaintiff always asks for a sufficiently large settlement so that if his offer is rejected, he
will proceed to court with probability one. This implies that in equilibrium, we will not see a withdrawal outcome!
In P’ng (1983), a plaintiff with a NEV suit might be able to extort a settlement from the defendant in a Nash
equilibrium. However, as indicated by Bebchuk (1988), this is not a subgame perfect equilibrium. The defendant has
perfect information and he knows when the plaintiff has a NEV suit. It is not a credible threat for the plaintiff to go
to trial if the defendant refuses to settle. Therefore, the defendant will not settle with the plaintiff with a NEV suit,
and such plaintiff will simply have to drop the case after filing it. However, this “withdrawal” equilibrium outcome
will vanish if we attach some litigation cost to such a strategy by the plaintiff. Since a plaintiff with a NEV suit
knows he will not be able to extort any settlement by bringing the suit against the defendant, therefore, to avoid the
litigation cost, he will simply choose not to file the action at all in the first place.
In Bebchuk (1988), the plaintiff has the private information regarding expected judgement, so that in some scenario,
a plaintiff with a NEV suit is able to extract a settlement offer by exploiting the fact that the defendant is uncertain
about the actual merit of the plaintiff’s case. In the case that a settlement fails, the plaintiff with a NEV suit can
always opt to drop the suit. Again, however, this “withdrawal” equilibrium outcome will not exist if the plaintiff has
to incur some cost by filing and then withdrawing a suit. Since the plaintiff has complete information, he knows,
based on the information, whether the defendant will offer to settle or not. In the face of some litigation cost to start
a suit, a plaintiff with a NEV suit will choose not to file the case in the first place if no settlement is foreseeable.
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industry or lobby group. By complying with their requests, the government earns political support
from these industries or lobbies, which can mean more political contributions or more electorate
votes in the future. These potential international political costs, net of domestic political support,
represent the various political forces that might influence a country’s decision to use the dispute
system.
The one-sided asymmetric information models of P’ng (1983) and Bebchuk (1988) as discussed
above can not explain the “withdrawn” cases if there is positive litigation cost associated with this
outcome. Nevertheless, the “withdrawn or abandoned” cases account for a non-negligible share of
complaints filed under the GATT regime. Overall, these constitute 27% of 207 complaints in the
GATT’s history during 1948–1989.8 In this paper, a two-sided asymmetric information framework
with potential litigation cost is used to explain these withdrawn cases. The intuition behind the
withdrawal outcome in this framework is that, because the litigation (political) cost accrues over
time to a complaining country once a dispute is brought under the GATT, a complaining country
that is not sufficiently optimistic about panel judgement will not pursue a case through the panel
procedure. In other words, he will withdraw the complaint if the defendant refuses to settle.
However, because of asymmetric information, the complaining country perceives initially some
probability that the defendant will settle. If the prospect of a settlement and the magnitude of
the settlement are large enough to compensate for the expected loss incurred in the event of a
withdrawal, this might justify the complainant’s decision to file the dispute in the first place.
The model’s results indicate that as the political cost increases relative to the potential benefit of
using this mechanism in resolving trade conflicts, the dispute procedure is initiated less frequently,
whereas the incidence of cases being withdrawn/abandoned increases at first but then decreases
until it becomes nil.
This study also explores the role of the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling in
determining countries’ incentives to block/appeal a panel report. It is shown that under both
the GATT and WTO regimes, there exists asymmetric advantage between the complainant and
defendant. The complainant’s potential benefit from blocking/appealing an adverse panel ruling
is uniformly less than the defendant’s, but it bears the same structure of cost as the latter. This
disadvantage to the complainant is diminished under the WTO procedure compared to the GATT,
8See Table 2.
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but it is not totally eliminated. It is also shown that as the level of legal controversy over panel
rulings increases overall, the frequency of panel reports being blocked under the GATT increases.
However, the propensity to appeal a report under the new WTO procedure is generally higher
than the propensity to block a panel report under the GATT when such appellate reviews were not
available.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a more detailed account of the
evolution of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism during its forty-eight-year history.
Section 3 introduces a theoretical structure of the dispute mechanism, including the payoff and
uncertainty countries might face during the process. In Section 4, the theoretical model is developed
and applied to explain the stylized facts that we observe in the data. Concluding remarks are
collected in Section 5.
2 The Evolution of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism
When the attempt to create an international trade organization in the late 1940s failed, the success-
fully negotiated trade agreement, the GATT, was left without a well-defined institutional structure.9
Only a few clauses with regard to dispute settlement were contained in the original GATT, most
of which centered around Article XXIII. The article states that a member country may request
consultation with another member country, should it consider that its benefit expected under the
GATT is being nullified or impaired by the other member country’s trade measure. If no settlement
is reached between the parties, the matter may be referred to the Contracting Parties, which shall
investigate and recommend action or give a ruling on the matter. In appropriately serious cases,
the Contracting Parties may also authorize retaliatory actions. Despite the skeletal framework of
Article XXIII, the dispute settlement in the early years of GATT worked rather smoothly, thanks
to its small and homogeneous membership. Disputes were resolved in plenary meetings by rulings
from the chair or consensus votes of member countries. As the procedure evolved, it began to dele-
gate members’ complaints to “working parties,” formed by interested governments. One remarkable
9For more details, see Jackson (2000, p. 119).
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development occurred in 1952 when the GATT started using “the panel on complaints.”10 A panel
composed of neutral government delegates would be established to hear and rule on a dispute. They
would act in their own capacities and independently of any government interests. This development
marked the beginning of third-party adjudication of legal claims brought under the GATT.
Because only the Contracting Parties had the power to decide on a matter, a panel report had
to be adopted or approved by the Contracting Parties before its rulings became binding. Because it
was a customary practice of GATT to require all decisions to be made by consensus, the procedure
was inherently subject to delaying or blocking by the defending party, which by raising objection
to consensus could keep the panel procedure from moving forward: the creation of the panel,
the selection of the panelists, the adoption of the panel report, the authorization of retaliation.
However, this delaying/blocking problem did not begin to surface until in the 1970s, the notorious
example being the DISC case brought by the EC against the US, and three US counter-claims.11
During the Tokyo Round negotiations conducted in 1973–1979, the dispute settlement mecha-
nism under the GATT developed on dual tracks. On one hand, the negotiating efforts to strengthen
the general dispute procedure of Article XXIII did not go very far. The produced “Understand-
ing”12 codified the established practices in implementing the procedure, but it was still ambiguous
about whether the complainant had an absolute right to a panel process, and it did not take away
the veto power of disputing parties in panel adoption. On the other hand, many of the new “MTN
Codes,” resulting from the negotiations’ efforts to restrain nontariff trade measures, also created
their own dispute procedures. They varied in the degree of rigor and automaticity, but gener-
ally appeared to grant the complainant an automatic right to panel procedures. In this respect,
the dispute procedures under these Codes were stronger than the GATT’s general procedure. The
consensus rule, nevertheless, was still upheld for panel adoption in these various Code procedures.13
In 1995, the WTO was established following the completion of the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions. The new Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) procedure under the WTO significantly
renovated several aspects of the old GATT machinery. No longer are the separate procedures under
the Tokyo Round Codes valid. The DSU will govern all parts of the GATT/WTO system and serve
10Hudec (1993), p. 30.
11See Hudec (1993), Complaint 69, 70, 71, 72.
12“Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance.”
13Hudec (1993), pp. 53–57.
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as the single, unified mechanism for dispute settlement. Furthermore, the blocking problem that
had concerned the GATT regime is completely eliminated. A complaining country will be granted
an automatic right to have a panel created. Thus blocking is prevented at this early stage. Most
importantly, a panel report will now be deemed automatically adopted by the new Dispute Settle-
ment Body (DSB). Nevertheless, an appellate procedure is added as a safeguard against possible
legal errors that may occur at the panel stage. Either one of the disputing parties may consider
appealing against the panel report to the Appellate Body (AB), whose judgment will be final and
likewise adopted automatically unless there is a consensus against adoption. Thus, blocking a panel
report under the new WTO procedure has become virtually impossible.14
3 The Setup
3.1 The Game tree
The GATT and WTO dispute settlement procedures can be represented by game trees as in Fig-
ure 1. Suppose a trade dispute arises. The complaining country (C) detects that a trade-related
practice implemented by the defending country (D) might be in violation of the GATT/WTO
agreement or constitute “nullification or impairment” of benefits C expected under the agreement.
C can consider whether or not to invoke the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure.
If C decides to file the complaint, it starts the litigation process, as indicated by the beginning
of Stage 0. In practice, C invokes the GATT/WTO process by requesting consultation with the
defending country D. The ensuing negotiations between the parties might take various forms. Here
the negotiating process is modelled as follows. Faced with a complaint, D decides whether to settle
with C or not. If D chooses to settle, C then decides whether or not to accept D’s proposed
settlement terms. On the other hand, if D refuses to settle, C then decides whether to continue or
withdraw from the litigation process. If the dispute is neither settled nor withdrawn, it proceeds
to the panel stage (Stage 1).
During the panel stage, a panel is established at C’s request to hear and rule on the matter.15
14Jackson (2000), pp. 177–178.
15I abstract from the issue that the request for a panel might be blocked by D under the GATT. In practice, it
was not as serious a problem as the blocking of a panel report, and usually a panel would eventually be established
in spite of initial blocking.
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Under the GATT procedure, a panel ruling is not binding unless it is adopted by the Contracting
Parties with consensus vote. If C’s claim is ruled negatively, C can choose whether to block the
report or not. In either case, no changes in D’s trade practices or policies are required. If C’s claim
is ruled positively, D can potentially block the adoption of the panel report. If D chooses not to,
the panel ruling becomes binding, and D is obligated to remove the confirmed trade barrier at the
beginning of Stage 2.16
Under the WTO procedure, a panel ruling is deemed automatically adopted unless it is appealed
by either parties. In the case of a “no violation” ruling and if C does not appeal, the dispute ends
and no changes in D’s trade practices are required. On the other hand, if a “violation” ruling
is not appealed, D is obligated to comply with the panel’s recommendations. The case proceeds
to the appellate stage (Stage 2) if either party appeals. During the appellate procedure, the
Appellate Body reviews the legal aspects of the panel reports and make final rulings on the case,
which may reverse the original panel rulings in favor of the other party. The appellate review will
likewise be automatically adopted, and is enforceable if a “violation” ruling against D is made. The
implementation is assumed to take place at the beginning of Stage 3.
3.2 The Payoff and Information Structure
If C decides not to file the case (nf ), nothing happens and the status quo welfare applies for
both countries, which is normalized to be zero. If C decides to file the case (f ), however, it
might incur some (pecuniary or nonpecuniary) cost or benefits as discussed above. These potential
international political costs or domestic political benefits may vary with country pairs, industries
involved, and international attitudes toward the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedure. Let
Kf represents the political cost incurred by C in every period, net of domestic political benefit,
by filing a complaint against D under the GATT/WTO. It is assumed that C incurs Kf in every
period once it files the dispute, unless the dispute is settled or withdrawn, in which case Kf is
incurred only for the period in which the dispute is present under the procedure.17
16To simplify the analysis, I abstract from the potential problem of non-implementation and assume that D will
comply with panel’s recommendations once the panel report is adopted. This assumption may not be as unrealistic
as it seems. In Hudec (1993, p. 278), it is documented that under the GATT, 90% of cases with violation rulings
were implemented in compliance with panel’s recommendations. If we take into account that some violation rulings
were blocked, the compliance rate with “adopted” panel reports should actually be higher.
17In other words, it is assumed that the damage or the benefit is permanent once the case is filed, but may be
terminated before the dispute is escalated to the panel stage.
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If faced with a complaint, D decides whether or not to settle with C. In reality, settlements
in trade negotiations specify changes in policies or practices used by D. Here, it is assumed that
the effects of such changes can be measured and summarized in monetary terms, the magnitude
of which is denoted S. A positive settlement amount (S > 0) means D is willing to settle, and S
represents a transfer of welfare from D to C as promised by the changes in D’s policies.18 Any zero
or negative settlement offer by D is equivalent to D’s refusal to settle.
When a case is brought before the panel, both parties are uncertain about possible panel
rulings. It is assumed that countries hold different interpretations about GATT/WTO law and
they therefore have subjective predictions about possible panel rulings. This is represented by pic
and pid, the respective probabilities that C and D predict that C’s claim will be ruled positively.
Private information also exists on both sides that enters into their predictions about panel rulings.
Therefore, disputing parties are not sure how optimistic the other party is about panel judgement.
It is assumed that each party believes the other party’s prediction to be uniformly distributed
among [0, 1].
Before the panel rulings are made, the parties are also uncertain about the quality of panel
rulings that will be made. Let L ∈ [0, 1] represent the degree of legal controversy that will arise
over a panel ruling. It is assumed that both parties consider the degree of legal controversy that
will arise over a certain panel ruling to be distributed with the probability density function (p.d.f.)
f(L|R), where R = {0, 1} corresponds to a “no violation/violation” ruling. That is, f(L|0) is the
p.d.f. of the degree of legal controversy that will arise over a “no violation” ruling, while f(L|1) is
the p.d.f. of the degree of legal controversy that will arise over a “violation” ruling.
At the point after the panel report is issued, the result (violation or no violation) and the quality
of the ruling (the degree of legal controversy) are revealed. Under the GATT, without an appellate
procedure, either party might consider blocking an adverse panel ruling given the quality of the
report. However, it is diplomatically costly to block a report, unless the report is indeed subject
to a large degree of legal controversy. To model this concept, the blocking cost function Kb(L) is
introduced, which is assumed to be a decreasing step function of L, as illustrated in Figure 2, which
shows that if the degree of legal controversy over a panel ruling is large enough (L > L¯), there is
18It is recognized that most trade measure changes exhibit non-zero sum natures. Here, and later in D’s imple-
mentation of panel recommendations, zero sum is assumed to simplify the analysis.
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no cost to block the report. Otherwise, it is costly.
Under the WTO, the appellate procedure was introduced as a safeguard measure against pos-
sible legal errors contained in panel rulings. It is assumed that the reversal probability of a panel
ruling by the Appellate Body is equal to the degree of legal controversy over it. In other words,
the higher is the legal controversy over a panel ruling, the more likely is the decision to be reversed
by the Appellate Body. For simplification, the cost to appeal a report is assumed to be negligible.
After a “violation” ruling is adopted, the defending country is obligated to remove the confirmed
trade barrier. In case of non-implementation, parties can also negotiate compensation (under the
WTO). As a last resort, C can be authorized to retaliate by withdrawing tariff concessions in the
same sector or in other sectors with equivalent value to C’s welfare loss due to D’s trade barrier.
In any of these outcomes, there will be a positive welfare transfer from D to C in every period. Let
V denote this equivalent value. Both C and D are assumed to have a common discount factor of δ
per period of time, where each stage of the process takes one period.
4 The Theoretical Model
4.1 The Incentives to Block/Appeal Panel Reports
GATT:
When D faces a “violation” ruling, the benefit from blocking this ruling is to avoid the need to
change the trade measure, which has value to D of V per period, or a continuation value of V1−δ .
Weighing against the cost to blocking the report, Kb(L), D will block the report if and only if
Kb(L) <
V
1− δ .
As illustrated in Figure 2, D blocks the report for all L > L¯.19 Prior to the panel, the degree of
legal controversy that will arise over a “violation” ruling is considered to be distributed with the
p.d.f. f(L|1). Therefore, both disputing parties predict that a violation ruling will be blocked by D
with a probability 1− F (L¯|1), where F (L|1) is the corresponding cumulative distribution function
of f(L|1). This blocking probability is indicated by the solid shaded area under f(L|1) for the
19It is assumed that if the degree of legal controversy is not large enough (L ≤ L¯), the cost is always larger than
the benefit to blocking a report.
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GATT regime in Figure 2.
On the other hand, when C faces a “no violation” ruling, the benefit to blocking this ruling is
0, since no changes in D’s trade measure will follow. Since the blocking cost is non-negative, C will
always choose not to block the report regardless of L. Therefore, prior to the panel, both disputing
parties expect a “no violation” ruling to be blocked by C with probability 0.
WTO:
Under the WTO, the veto power of parties to block the adoption of a report is taken away.
Instead, the appellate procedure was introduced to guard against possible legal errors contained in
panel rulings. As assumed earlier, the reversal probability of a panel ruling by the Appellate Body
is equal to the degree of legal controversy over it. Therefore, the benefit to D of appealing against
a “violation” ruling is
V + L
δ
1− δV,
where the first term is the gain in delaying the implementation for one period during which the
appellate process takes place and the second term is the gain that the “violation” ruling may be
reversed with probability L and D can avoid the implementation completely. The more controversial
a panel ruling is, the more beneficial it is for D to appeal. This benefit function is indicated in
Figure 2. Since the cost of appeal is assumed to be negligible, D will always appeal a “violation”
ruling regardless of L. Therefore, prior to the panel, both disputing parties expect a violation
ruling to be appealed by D with probability 1. This probability is indicated by the solid shaded
area under f(L|1) for the WTO regime in Figure 2.
On the other hand, when C faces a “no violation” ruling, the benefit of appeal is
L
δ
1− δV,
which is the gain that the “no violation” ruling may be reversed with probability L and changes
in D’s trade measure are required. Again, it is always beneficial for C to appeal a “no violation”
ruling regardless of L, as the cost is negligible. Therefore, prior to the panel, both parties also
expect a “no violation” ruling to be appealed by C with probability 1, as indicated by the solid
shaded area under f(L|0) for the WTO regime in Figure 2.
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Implications:
Four implications follow immediately from the model above. First, under both GATT and
WTO regimes, there exists asymmetric advantage between C and D. C’s potential benefit of block-
ing/appealing an adverse panel ruling is uniformly less than D’s, but it bears the same structure
of cost as D. Second, this disadvantage to C is diminished under the WTO procedure compared to
the GATT. However, it is not totally eliminated, mainly because under the GATT/WTO system,
given a violation ruling, D is not required to make compensation to C for the loss that was incurred
before and during the litigation process. Third, if the level of legal controversy increases overall so
that the p.d.f. f(L|R) shifts to the right, the frequency of panel reports being blocked under the
GATT will increase. This increase is illustrated by the dotted shaded area in Figure 2. Fourth,
the frequency of appeal under the WTO overall should be much higher than the frequency of panel
reports being blocked under the GATT.
In Table 1, we see that under the GATT regime, there was a surge in the frequency of panel
reports being blocked in the 1980s compared to preceding years. As discussed earlier, the Tokyo
Round negotiations produced several new “MTN Codes.” These Codes broadened the GATT’s
scope significantly and submitted more contentious and sensitive nontariff trade measures to inter-
national discipline. In general, it would be more difficult to rule on the legitimacy of a nontariff
measure than on a technical tariff measure. Moreover, many of these new Codes contained their
own dispute settlement procedures. These various stronger Code procedures along with the more
restrained procedure of Article XXIII created a complex and fragmented system of dispute set-
tlement under the GATT. These increases in the demand for legal capacity, following the Tokyo
Round, however, were not coupled with equivalent increases in the supply of legal resources pro-
vided by the GATT institution. Therefore, we would expect the panel reports to be subject to
higher degrees of legal controversy overall in the 1980s following the Tokyo Round. This confirms
the hypothesis that if the level of legal controversy increases overall, so that the p.d.f. f(L|R) shifts
to the right, the frequency of panel reports being blocked under the GATT will increase.20
In addition, Table 1 also verifies the model’s prediction that the frequency of appeal under the
20The proposition that the disputes invoking “MTN Codes” were more complex in nature and induced a possibly
higher degree of legal controversy over resulting panel reports and higher frequency of blocking incidence can be
further supported by the statistics in Table 3. In Table 3, we see that the disputes invoking “MTN Codes” were
blocked at a much higher frequency (58%) than the overall complaints (21%) during the 1980s, confirming that the
“MTN Codes” were the major contributing source of the increase in blocked cases.
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WTO should be much higher than the frequency of panel reports being blocked under the GATT.
With the new appellate procedure under the WTO, about 78% of panel rulings were appealed,
which is much higher than the frequency (12.5%) of panel reports being blocked overall under the
GATT.21 Finally, Table 1 also indicates that under the GATT regime, the defendant blocked the
report at a higher frequency than the complainant, given an adverse ruling. This verifies the above
analysis that asymmetric advantages existed under the GATT dispute settlement system that put
the complainant in a less favorable position.
4.2 The Interactions at the Consultation Stage
As illustrated in Figure 1, if C files the complaint, the dispute will end up in one of the three
following outcomes: ruled by the panel, withdrawn, or settled. Under the GATT regime, prior
to the panel, C predicts that the panel will give a “violation” ruling with probability pic and that
the ruling will be adopted successfully with probability F (L¯|1). In this case, C will receive the
compensation-equivalent of V in every period from the beginning of stage 2. C also predicts a
probability 1 − pic of losing the case and receiving nothing. Once the case is filed, C also has to
incur the political cost Kf in every period. Therefore, the expected welfare change in present value
for C from a panel procedure is
E∆W pc = picF (L¯|1)
δ2
1− δV −
1
1− δK
f ≡ picβ δ
2
1− δV −
1
1− δK
f ,
where β ≡ F (L¯|1). From D’s perspective, however, D predicts a probability pid that C will prevail
in the trial and a chance F (L¯|1) that he will not block the ruling. Therefore, D’s expected welfare
change from the panel procedure is
E∆W pd = −pidF (L¯|1)
δ2
1− δV = −pidβ
δ2
1− δV.
If the case is withdrawn, C incurs the political cost Kf for the period the case is present.
Therefore, ∆Wwc = −Kf . On the other hand, if C withdraws the dispute, D maintains its status
21The simplifying assumption of the model that the cost of appeal is negligible has led to the strong prediction
that all panel reports under the WTO will be appealed. By allowing for some appellate cost (lawyers, etc.) in the
model, panel reports will not always be appealed.
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quo welfare: ∆Wwd = 0. If the case is settled at the terms S in present value, C receives the
settlement amount but also incurs the political costKf for the period the case is present. Therefore,
the payoff to C is ∆W sc = S −Kf . The payoff to D by settling at the terms S, compared to the
status quo welfare, is ∆W sd = −S.
C’s decision to continue or withdraw the litigation:
As illustrated in Figure 1, if D does not offer to settle, C has to decide whether to continue or
withdraw the complaint. C is indifferent between continuing and withdrawing the complaint when
its expected payoff from a panel is equal to withdrawal. That is, E∆W pc = ∆Wwc :
picβ
δ2
1− δV −
1
1− δK
f = −Kf ,
⇒ pic = K
f
δβV
≡ p˜ic. (1)
For all pic ≥ p˜ic, C expects a higher payoff from panel proceedings than from giving up, so C will
choose to continue litigation. On the other hand, for all pic < p˜ic, C will withdraw the case.
C’s decision to accept or reject a settlement offer:
On the other hand, if D offers to settle at the terms S, there exists a corresponding type of C
with expectation pic(S) such that he is indifferent between accepting and rejecting the offer. The
level of expectation corresponding to the settlement offer S such that E∆W pc = ∆W sc is:
picβ
δ2
1− δV −
1
1− δK
f = S −Kf
⇒ pic = 1− δ
δ2βV
S + p˜ic ≡ pic(S) (2)
For all pic > pic(S), C is more optimistic about the panel ruling than the borderline type pic(S), so
that he prefers to continue the litigation and not to settle. On the other hand, for all pic < pic(S),
C is less optimistic than pic(S) and will opt to accept the offer S.
D’s settlement decision:
Because there is two-sided asymmetric information, D is not certain how optimistic C is about
the panel judgement and whether C will proceed to the panel stage if he refuses to settle. On the
other hand, C is not sure how pessimistic D is about the panel judgement and whether D is willing
to settle if he files the complaint.
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Suppose the lowest type of C (C with the least optimistic prediction about panel rulings) that
will file a complaint is pic, and suppose that D’s belief about this is pibc. Then, given a settlement
offer S, D expects that pic ∈ [pibc, pic(S)] will accept the offer, while pic ∈ [pic(S), 1] will reject the
offer and proceed to the panel stage. Because D believes pic to be uniformly distributed among
[0, 1], D views the probability that pic ∈ [pibc, pic(S)] as pic(S)− pibc. Therefore, D’s interim expected
payoff from proposing an offer S is:
E∆W sd (S) = −[pic(S)− pibc]S − [1− pic(S)]S¯d,
where S¯d = −E∆W pd is the expected welfare loss from the panel proceedings.
In some equilibrium, it may be optimal for C to file the complaint even if he is less optimistic than
the borderline type p˜ic. In other words, he will withdraw the complaint if D does not offer to settle.
However, there is some probability that D might settle because of the asymmetric information.
If the prospect of a settlement and the magnitude of the settlement are large enough, this might
justify C’s decision to file the complaint. In terms of the notation of the model, this corresponds
to pic < p˜ic.
Suppose D believes that pibc < p˜ic. Then all offers S such that pic(S) < p˜ic correspond to S < 0
(see equation (2)). This is equivalent to no settlement, and all pic ∈ [p˜ic, 1] will request a panel
procedure by definition of p˜ic, while all pic ∈ [pibc, p˜ic] will withdraw the complaint. Therefore, D’s
expected payoff is −(1− p˜ic)S¯d. Moreover, when pic(S) = p˜ic, it corresponds to S = 0, and E∆W sd
reduces to −(1 − p˜ic)S¯d. On the other hand, suppose that pibc > p˜ic. Then for all offers S such
that pic(S) < pibc, D’s offer is not large enough to settle even with the lowest type of C who files.
Since pibc > p˜ic, all pic ∈ [pibc, 1] will proceed to the panel stage. In this case, D’s expected payoff
is −(1 − pibc)S¯d. Furthermore, when pic(S) = pibc, E∆W sd reduces to −(1 − pibc)S¯d. Therefore, D’s
expected payoff from settling or not settling is:
E∆W fd =

−[1−max{pibc, p˜ic}]S¯d ∀ S s.t. pic(S) ≤ max{pibc, p˜ic}, or equivalently ‘not settle’,
E∆W sd (S) ∀ S s.t. pic(S) ≥ max{pibc, p˜ic}.
This objective function E∆W fd is illustrated in Figure 3. Suppose S
e is the maximizer of
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E∆W sd (S). Since E∆W
s
d (S) is a concave function and E∆W
f
d is continuous at max{pibc, p˜ic}, it
follows that E∆W sd (S
e) ≥ −[1 − max{pibc, p˜ic}]S¯d, if pic(Se) ≥ max{pibc, p˜ic}. In this case, it is
optimal for D to offer to settle at Se. This scenario is indicated by the “Settle” column in Figure 3.
On the other hand, if pic(Se) < max{pibc, p˜ic}, it is optimal for D not to settle. This scenario is
indicated by the column of “Do not Settle” in Figure 3.
We now characterize the optimal offer, Se. Se should satisfy the first order condition: ∂E∆W
s
d
∂S =
−[∂pic(S)∂S (S − S¯d) + pic(S)− pibc] = 0. Use the definition of pic(S) in equation (2) and the definition
of S¯d. It is straightforward to show that
Se =
1
2
δ2βV
1− δ (pid − p˜ic + pi
b
c), (3)
pie ≡ pic(Se) = 12(pid + p˜ic + pi
b
c). (4)
Therefore, if pie > max{pibc, p˜ic}, the optimal strategy for D is to propose the settlement offer Se,
which C will accept for all pic ∈ [pibc, pie] and reject for all pic ∈ [pie, 1]. Otherwise, it is optimal for
D not to settle.
C’s filing decision and equilibrium outcomes:
Before C files the complaint, C is not sure how pessimistic D is about panel judgement and
whether D will offer to settle if he files the complaint. As indicated by equations (3) and (4),
when D is more pessimistic (higher pid) about panel judgement, D is willing to propose a larger
settlement Se. On the other hand, when D becomes more optimistic (lower pid), the settlement offer
will shrink, up to a point where D will opt not to settle (pie ≤ max{pibc, p˜ic}). Given D’s settlement
strategy, therefore, C will decide to file the complaint if the expected payoff from various possible
outcomes combined is non-negative.
Suppose in equilibrium, the lowest type of C (C with the least optimistic prediction about panel
rulings) that will file a complaint is piec. In equilibrium, D’s belief should be consistent with C’s
strategy, so in characterizing the equilibrium, pibc will be replaced with pi
e
c.
As we will see, the type of equilibrium that will emerge depends crucially on the value p˜ic. p˜ic
as defined in equation (1) is the ratio of the political cost incurred by C to bring a dispute against
D relative to the value of the disputed trade measure discounted by blocking probability and time
lag in implementation. Therefore, we can regard p˜ic as the cost to file the complaint relative to
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possible benefits. As the cost increases, it is less favorable for C to continue litigation, unless C
is strongly optimistic about the panel judgement. Therefore, there is less possibility that C will
proceed to the panel. In light of this, D will be less likely to propose to settle or will offer to settle
at less favorable terms. In the end, the lowest type of C that will file a complaint, piec, has to be
higher.
An overview of the various sorts of equilibria that will emerge is provided in Figure 4. In
each panel of this figure, various equilibrium outcomes are indicated for all possible combinations
of pid, the defendant’s perceived probability of losing a case, and pic, the complainant’s perceived
probability of winning. The possible outcomes are: “nf ”, that the complainant does not file the
case; “w” that they file and withdraw; “s” that they file and accept a settlement offered by the
defendant; and “p” that the case proceeds to a GATT/WTO panel. Outcomes depend not only
on pid and pic, but also on other parameters such as p˜ic, which represents the political cost of filing
a case, and δ, the discount factor. When p˜ic is smaller than δ, six possible types of equilibria arise,
each of them corresponding to a different level of p˜ic. Three of these include the possibility of
withdrawal of the dispute, and are labelled “FW1–3”. The others do not, and are labelled “FP1–
3”. In all of the cases, the sizes of the regions for each outcome give some sense of how likely the
outcomes may be, especially when the two perceived probabilities are uniformly distributed on the
interval [0, 1].
In what follows, proofs are given that characterize each of these equilibria. The results include
the conditions on the political cost p˜ic under which a particular type of equilibrium will emerge, the
complainant’s filing decision, piec, the defendant’s settlement decision, the incidence of “withdrawal”
outcome, and its property as p˜ic varies.
Equilibrium “FP1”: p˜ic ≤ 0 (⇒ Kf ≤ 0)
When p˜ic ≤ 0, it implies that Kf ≤ 0 (see equation (1)). Recall the definition of Kf from
Section 3.2, Kf is the international political cost incurred by C in every period, net of domestic
political benefit, from filing a complaint against D under the GATT/WTO. When Kf ≤ 0, this is a
situation where the political benefit from domestic support is larger than the international political
cost. In this case, because p˜ic ≤ 0, it follows that for all pic ∈ [0, 1], E∆W pc ≥ ∆Wwc = −Kf ≥ 0.
Therefore, regardless whether D will offer to settle or not, C’s payoff from all possible outcomes by
filing the complaint is non-negative. Therefore, C will always file the complaint. This is equivalent
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to piec = 0. Replacing pi
b
c with pi
e
c = 0 in equations (3) and (4) at the equilibrium, D’s settlement
decisions are
Se =
1
2
δ2βV
1− δ (pid − p˜ic) (5)
pie =
1
2
(pid + p˜ic). (6)
For all pid ∈ [−p˜ic, 1], pie > max{piec, p˜ic} = 0. Therefore, D will offer to settle at Se, which pic ∈ [0, pie]
will accept, and pic ∈ [pie, 1] will reject and proceed to the panel stage. On the other hand, for all
pid ∈ [0,−p˜ic], D will not settle and all pic ∈ [0, 1] will go on to the panel procedure. This equilibrium
is illustrated by panel “FP1” in Figure 4.
Equilibrium “FW1”: 0 < p˜ic < δ, 0 = piec < p˜ic, E∆W
f
c (piec) > 0
The following three scenarios look at the situation when 0 < p˜ic < δ. In other words, there is
strictly positive political cost. However, the magnitude of the cost p˜ic is small enough such that C
with pic < p˜ic will file the complaint in the equilibrium. These types of C face a probability that D
will not settle and in turn they will have to withdraw the case and incur some loss. However, there
is also some probability that D will offer to settle and the settlement terms will be good enough so
that the overall expected payoff by filing the complaint is non-negative and it justifies their decision
to file the complaint.
Suppose initially that the lowest type of C who files is pic < p˜ic. For pic ∈ [pic, p˜ic], they have the
same expected payoff from filing, because they will either withdraw or settle, with a payoff that
does not depend on pic. If the expected payoff from filing is positive for the lowest type pic, this
will induce lower types of C to file and hence pic will decrease. When pic decreases, D’s offer Se
decreases (see equation (3)). In turn, C’s expected payoff from filing E∆W fc decreases too. This
will continue until pic = 0 despite that E∆W
f
c is still positive, or until E∆W
f
c equals zero for some
positive pic. We now characterize the first scenario.
When piec = 0, D’s settlement decisions reduce to (5) and (6). For all pid ∈ [p˜ic, 1], pie >
max{piec, p˜ic} = p˜ic. Therefore, D will offer to settle at Se, which pic ∈ [0, pie] will accept, and
pic ∈ [pie, 1] will reject and the dispute proceeds to a panel. On the other hand, for all pid ∈ [0, p˜ic],
D will not settle. In this case, pic ∈ [0, p˜ic] will withdraw and pic ∈ [p˜ic, 1] will continue the litigation
and request a panel. These outcomes are illustrated in panel “FW1” of Figure 4.
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Because C believes pid to be uniformly distributed among [0, 1], C views the probability that
pid ∈ [0, p˜ic] to be p˜ic, in which case D will not settle. Otherwise, D will settle at Se. Therefore, for
pic = piec, the expected payoff from filing is
E∆W fc (pi
e
c) = p˜ic∆W
w
c +
∫ 1
p˜ic
∆W sc dpid
= p˜ic(−Kf ) +
∫ 1
p˜ic
(Se −Kf ) dpid
= −Kf +
∫ 1
p˜ic
Se dpid.
Using the formula for Se from equation (5), it is straightforward to show that E∆W fc (0) =
1
4
δβV
1−δ [−4(1 − δ)p˜ic + δ(1 − p˜ic)2]. To satisfy the condition of Equilibrium “FW1”, this has to be
strictly positive. It can be shown that E∆W fc (0) > 0 if and only if p˜ic < 2−δδ − 2
√
1−δ
δ , where
the value on the right hand side is strictly positive. Therefore, we can sum up this equilibrium as
follows:
Equilibrium “FW1”

0 < p˜ic < 2−δδ − 2
√
1−δ
δ
piec = 0
pie = 12(pid + p˜ic) ∀ pid ∈ [p˜ic, 1]
‘not settle’ ∀ pid ∈ [0, p˜ic]
For pic ∈ [0, p˜ic], they face a probability p˜ic that pid ∈ [0, p˜ic], in which case, D will not settle and
they will have to withdraw the dispute. This withdrawal probability increases as p˜ic increases.
Equilibrium “FW2”: 0 < p˜ic < δ, 0 ≤ piec < p˜ic, E∆W fc (piec) = 0, p˜ic + piec < 1
In Equilibrium “FW1”, we see that when p˜ic is small enough, it is justified for all types of C to file
(piec = 0) and the larger p˜ic is, the larger the probability of observing a complaint being withdrawn.
When p˜ic continues increasing, however, D’s settlement terms will become less favorable and the
expected payoff for the initial lowest filing type will decrease, up to a point where the expected
payoff from filing E∆W fc will become zero. With an even larger p˜ic, E∆W
f
c will become negative
for the initial lowest filing type, so some of the lower type will exit the process until E∆W fc becomes
just equal to zero for the new lowest type. We now characterize this equilibrium.
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Replacing pibc with pi
e
c in equations (3) and (4) at the equilibrium, D’s settlement decisions are
Se =
1
2
δ2βV
1− δ (pid − p˜ic + pi
e
c) (7)
pie =
1
2
(pid + p˜ic + piec). (8)
The condition p˜ic + piec < 1 implies that p˜ic is still not too large and that pi
e will be less than 1 for
all possible types of D. For all pid ∈ [p˜ic − piec, 1], pie > max{piec, p˜ic} = p˜ic. Therefore, D will offer to
settle at Se, which pic ∈ [piec, pie] will accept, and pic ∈ [pie, 1] will reject and proceed to the panel
stage. On the other hand, for all pid ∈ [0, p˜ic − piec], D will not settle. In this case, pic ∈ [piec, p˜ic] will
withdraw the complaint and pic ∈ [p˜ic, 1] will continue and proceed to the panel. These outcomes
are illustrated in panel “FW2” of Figure 4.
To derive the condition on p˜ic under which such an equilibrium will arise, note that for pic = piec,
the expected payoff from filing is
E∆W fc (pi
e
c) = (p˜ic − piec)∆Wwc +
∫ 1
p˜ic−piec
∆W sc dpid
= (p˜ic − piec)(−Kf ) +
∫ 1
p˜ic−piec
(Se −Kf ) dpid
= −Kf +
∫ 1
p˜ic−piec
Se dpid.
Using the formula for Se from equation (7), we can show that E∆W fc (piec) =
1
4
δβV
1−δ [−4(1 − δ)p˜ic +
δ(1− p˜ic+piec)2]. The condition that E∆W fc (piec) = 0 implies that piec = p˜ic+2
√
1−δ
δ
√
p˜ic− 1. As the
conditions on this equilibrium suggest, piec has to be between zero and p˜ic and such that p˜ic+pi
e
c < 1.
These conditions translate correspondingly into the conditions on the scope of p˜ic. They are: (a)
0 ≤ piec ⇒ p˜ic ≥ 2−δδ − 2
√
1−δ
δ ; (b) pi
e
c < p˜ic ⇒ p˜ic < δ4(1−δ) ; (c) piec + p˜ic < 1 ⇒ p˜ic < 1+δ2δ −
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ .
Therefore, this equilibrium can be summarized as follows:
Equilibrium “FW2”

2−δ
δ − 2
√
1−δ
δ ≤ p˜ic < min{ δ4(1−δ) , 1+δ2δ −
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ }
piec = p˜ic + 2
√
1−δ
δ
√
p˜ic − 1
pie = 12(pid + p˜ic + pi
e
c) ∀ pid ∈ [p˜ic − piec, 1]
‘not settle’ ∀ pid ∈ [0, p˜ic − piec]
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For pic ∈ [piec, p˜ic], they face a probability p˜ic − piec that pid ∈ [0, p˜ic − piec], in which case, D will
not settle and they will have to withdraw the dispute. It can be shown that this withdrawal
probability, p˜ic − piec = 1 − 2
√
1−δ
δ
√
p˜ic, decreases as p˜ic increases. Therefore, from Equilibrium
“FW1” to Equilibrium “FW2”, as the political cost p˜ic increases, the incidence of “withdrawal”
outcome increases at first but then starts to decrease as p˜ic increases further.
Equilibrium “FW3”: 0 < p˜ic < δ, 0 < piec < p˜ic, E∆W
f
c (piec) = 0, p˜ic + pi
e
c ≥ 1
As p˜ic keeps increasing such that p˜ic + piec ≥ 1, however, D’s settlement offer will hit the upper
bound pie = 1. In equation (8), note that pie = 1 when pid = 2 − p˜ic − piec, which is no bigger than
1 if p˜ic + piec ≥ 1. For all pid ∈ [p˜ic − piec, 2 − p˜ic − piec], pie > max{piec, p˜ic} = p˜ic. Therefore, D will
offer to settle at Se, which pic ∈ [piec, pie] will accept, and pic ∈ [pie, 1] will reject and proceed to the
panel stage. For all pid ∈ [2− p˜ic− piec, 1], D will offer to settle at the upper bound pie = 1, which all
pic ∈ [piec, 1] will accept. At last, for all pid ∈ [0, p˜ic − piec], D will not settle. In this case, pic ∈ [piec, p˜ic]
will withdraw the complaint and pic ∈ [p˜ic, 1] will go on to the panel procedure. These outcomes are
illustrated in panel “FW3” of Figure 4.
Note that C views the probability that pid ∈ [2− p˜ic − piec, 1] to be p˜ic + piec − 1. In that case, D
will offer to settle at pie = 1, which corresponds to Se = (1− p˜ic) δ2βV1−δ (see equation (2)). Therefore,
for pic = piec, the expected payoff from filing is
E∆W fc (pi
e
c) = (p˜ic − piec)∆Wwc +
∫ 2−p˜ic−piec
p˜ic−piec
∆W sc dpid + (p˜ic + pi
e
c − 1)∆W sc |Se=(1−p˜ic) δ2βV1−δ
= (p˜ic − piec)(−Kf ) +
∫ 2−p˜ic−piec
p˜ic−piec
(Se −Kf ) dpid + (p˜ic + piec − 1)[(1− p˜ic)
δ2βV
1− δ −K
f ]
= −Kf +
∫ 2−p˜ic−piec
p˜ic−piec
Se dpid + (p˜ic + piec − 1)(1− p˜ic)
δ2βV
1− δ .
Using the formula for Se from equation (7), it can be shown that E∆W fc (piec) =
δβV
1−δ [−(1− δ)p˜ic +
δpiec(1 − p˜ic)]. The condition that E∆W fc (piec) = 0 implies that piec = (1−δ)p˜icδ(1−p˜ic) . Given the conditions
of this equilibrium on piec, we can derive the corresponding conditions on p˜ic. They are: (a) 0 < pi
e
c:
this is automatically satisfied by the fact that 0 < δ < 1 and 0 < p˜ic < δ; (b) piec < p˜ic ⇒ p˜ic < 2δ−1δ ;
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(c) piec + p˜ic ≥ 1 ⇒ p˜ic ≥ 1+δ2δ −
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ . Therefore, we can sum up this equilibrium as follows:
Equilibrium “FW3”

1+δ
2δ −
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ ≤ p˜ic < 2δ−1δ
piec =
(1−δ)p˜ic
δ(1−p˜ic)
pie = 12(pid + p˜ic + pi
e
c) ∀ pid ∈ [p˜ic − piec, 2− p˜ic − piec]
pie = 1 ∀ pid ∈ [2− p˜ic − piec, 1]
‘not settle’ ∀ pid ∈ [0, p˜ic − piec]
For pic ∈ [piec, p˜ic], they face a probability p˜ic − piec that pid ∈ [0, p˜ic − piec], in which case, they will
have to withdraw the dispute. This withdrawal probability, p˜ic − piec = p˜ic − (1−δ)p˜icδ(1−p˜ic) , can be shown
to decrease as p˜ic increases. Therefore, when the political cost p˜ic increases further, the incidence
of “withdrawal” outcome decreases further until it disappears, as is the case in the following two
equilibria.
Equilibrium “FP2”: 0 < p˜ic < δ, p˜ic ≤ piec, E∆W fc (piec) = 0, p˜ic + piec < 1
The next two equilibria still concern the situation when 0 < p˜ic < δ. However, the magnitude of
the cost p˜ic is relatively large such that piec < p˜ic will not be sustainable. In other words, for pic < p˜ic,
they will not attempt to file the complaint at all. Instead, in the equilibrium, piec ≥ p˜ic so that if D
refuses to settle, all C who file will proceed to the panel procedure.
At the equilibrium, the expected payoff E∆W fc for the lowest type of C who files should be
non-negative. E∆W fc can not be positive for piec ≥ p˜ic, however, because if it is, lower types of
C than p˜ic will file the complaint. This will fall into the former “FW” equilibria and contradict
the premise. Therefore, at the equilibrium, E∆W fc should be equal to zero for some piec ≥ p˜ic.
Analogous to Equilibria “FW2–3”, there are two possible scenarios, depending on the magnitude
of p˜ic. They are “FP2” when p˜ic is relatively small (p˜ic + piec < 1) and “FP3” when p˜ic is relatively
large (p˜ic + piec ≥ 1). The derivations of the two equilibria are relegated to the appendix.
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In Equilibrium “FP2”, the condition on p˜ic and the outcomes at the equilibrium are:
Equilibrium “FP2”

δ
4(1−δ) ≤ p˜ic < 1+δ2δ −
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ
piec = p˜ic + 2
√
1−δ
δ
√
p˜ic − 1
pie = 12(pid + p˜ic + pi
e
c) ∀ pid ∈ [piec − p˜ic, 1]
‘not settle’ ∀ pid ∈ [0, piec − p˜ic]
The outcomes are illustrated in panel “FP2” of Figure 4. It can be shown that piec − p˜ic = −1 +
2
√
1−δ
δ
√
p˜ic increases as p˜ic increases. Therefore, as the cost p˜ic increases, the portion of C who files,
(1− piec), shrinks at a faster rate than the increase in p˜ic.
Equilibrium “FP3”: 0 < p˜ic < δ, p˜ic ≤ piec, E∆W fc (piec) = 0, p˜ic + piec ≥ 1
As shown in the appendix, Equilibrium “FP3” can be characterized as follows:
Equilibrium “FP3”

max{1+δ2δ −
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ ,
2δ−1
δ } ≤ p˜ic < δ
piec =
(1−δ)p˜ic
δ(1−p˜ic)
pie = 12(pid + p˜ic + pi
e
c) ∀ pid ∈ [piec − p˜ic, 2− p˜ic − piec]
pie = 1 ∀ pid ∈ [2− p˜ic − piec, 1]
‘not settle’ ∀ pid ∈ [0, piec − p˜ic]
The outcomes are illustrated in panel “FP3” of Figure 4. It can be shown that piec−p˜ic = (1−δ)p˜icδ(1−p˜ic)−p˜ic
increases as p˜ic increases. Therefore, again, as the political cost p˜ic increases, the portion of C who
files, (1− piec), shrinks at a faster rate than the increase in p˜ic.
Equilibrium “NF”: p˜ic ≥ δ
When p˜ic is larger than δ, it can be shown that the expected payoff from the panel procedure,
withdrawal, or settlement will all render C negative payoffs regardless of his type pic. Therefore, C
will not file the complaint. Let us denote this scenario Equilibrium “NF”. This situation happens
when the political cost p˜ic is too high, and C will not attempt to bring the dispute against D.
The argument is as follows. First of all, recall that E∆W pc = picβ δ
2
1−δV − 11−δKf . It is straight-
forward to show that E∆W pc = 0 when pic = p˜icδ ≡ pˆic. In the case that p˜ic ≥ δ, it follows that
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pˆic ≥ 1. Therefore, for all pic ∈ [0, 1], E∆W pc < 0. Second, since p˜ic ≥ δ > 0, it implies that Kf > 0.
Therefore, ∆Wwc = −Kf < 0, for all types of C. Third, even if D is willing to settle at pie = 1,
i.e., with all possible types of C, the corresponding settlement amount is Se = (1 − p˜ic) δ2βV1−δ (see
equation (2)). The payoff to C is ∆W sc = S
e −Kf = (1 − p˜ic) δ2βV1−δ −Kf = δ
2βV
1−δ (1 − p˜icδ ), which
is negative because p˜ic > δ. In sum, if C files, the expected payoffs are negative in all possible
outcomes. Therefore, C will not file the complaint, regardless of his type pic. This is equivalent to
piec = 1.
Implications:
The various sorts of equilibria discussed above and their corresponding parameter space are
illustrated in Figure 5. Depending on the level of the discount factor δ, as the political cost p˜ic
increases, some equilibrium may not exist at all.22 For larger discount factor relative to 23 , the
equilibrium “FP2” does not exist. On the other hand, when the discount factor is relatively small,
the equilibrium “FW3” is not sustainable. Otherwise, corresponding to a rising political cost p˜ic,
the different kinds of equilibria emerge successively in the order that were discussed above.
Two implications follow from the analysis above. First, recall from the discussion of the
equilibria above that as the political cost p˜ic increases, the incidence of “withdrawal” outcome
increases at first (Equilibrium “FW1”), but then starts to decrease as p˜ic continues increasing
(Equilibrium “FW2”), and decreases further (Equilibrium “FW3”) until it disappears (Equilib-
rium “FP2”/“FP3”). Therefore, the greatest “withdrawal” incidence should occur at the point
where equilibrium turns from “FW1” to “FW2”. These ideas can be similarly illustrated by Fig-
ure 4. In Figure 4, the incidence of “withdrawal” outcome can be represented by the region denoted
“w”. The region starts small in Equilibrium “FW1” and grows large toward Equilibrium “FW2”.
As Equilibrium “FW2” begins, the area is substantial. However, the region will start to shrink
toward Equilibrium “FW3” (if we assume the discount factor δ to be relatively high so that “FW3”
but not “FP2” exists) and continue to shrink through it until the area disappears as in Equilibrium
“FP3”. Second, the equilibrium outcomes also suggest that as the political cost p˜ic increases, the
portion of C who files decreases monotonically. The portion of C who files can be represented by
the segment [piec, 1] as in Figure 4. As the political cost p˜ic increases, the portion of C who files
22At δ = 2
3
, the three lines, “ δ
4(1−δ)”, “
1+δ
2δ
−
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ
”, “ 2δ−1
δ
”, cross one another.
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stays the same at first (Equilibrium “FW1”), but then starts to decrease as p˜ic continues increasing
(Equilibrium “FW2”), and decreases further (Equilibrium “FW3” → “FP3”) until it disappears
(Equilibrium “NF”).
Therefore, if we are willing to assume that the population of trade disputes is uniformly dis-
tributed across different pairs of subjective predictions (pic, pid), then corresponding to different
levels of political cost p˜ic, we should observe some systematic patterns of filing and withdrawal.
When the political cost p˜ic is very low, a lot of complaints will be filed but relatively few com-
plaints will be withdrawn (as in Equilibrium “FW1”). When the political cost p˜ic is medium, fewer
complaints will be filed but a lot of them will be withdrawn (as in Equilibrium “FW2”). When
the cost p˜ic is high, even fewer complaints will be filed and relatively few will be withdrawn (as in
Equilibrium “FW3”). Finally, the cost becomes so high that very few complaints will be filed and
none of them withdrawn (as in Equilibrium “FP3”).
If we look at the statistics for the GATT regime in Table 2, we see that the pattern of total
complaints and cases withdrawn varied across different decades. In the 1950s, 53 trade disputes
were brought under the GATT legal system, ten of which were withdrawn. In the 1960s, the system
basically fell into a void. Merely seven times was the dispute settlement procedure invoked, and
no complaints were withdrawn. In the 1970s, the legal activities seemed to thrive again with 32
new cases filed and five of them withdrawn. This momentum continued into the 1980s when we
witnessed a surge in both litigation (115 complaints) and withdrawals (40 cases).
To understand the data, we can use the results from the model above and assign to each decade
a likely level of political cost that might be experienced on average by all countries utilizing the
GATT dispute settlement system. Judging from the amount of complaints and withdrawn cases in
each decade, the order of magnitude of political cost for each decade, from small to large, is likely to
be: 1980s, 1950s, 1970s, and 1960s. The corresponding representative equilibrium for these decades
is likely to be “FW2”, “FW2/FW3”, “FW3”, and “FP3”, respectively.
As documented by Hudec (1993), the GATT started with a small group of homogeneous coun-
tries. Most of them were small European states which were accustomed to using international
litigation procedure in resolving conflicts. Therefore, the dispute settlement procedure of the 1950s
was dealt with as common practice, with no significant feeling of hostility about it. Therefore, the
international political cost of using the GATT dispute settlement procedure in this decade should
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not have been too high.
In the 1960’s, two major changes occurred to the system: the European Community was es-
tablished, which replaced the original six smaller states with one larger trade negotiating entity;
and the number of developing country members expanded rapidly. Both of these groups demanded
major exemptions from the GATT obligations and the former advocated a diplomatic approach to
all policy conflicts, contrary to the formal GATT legal procedures. This “anti-legalist” position
prevailed among developed countries, including the US, such that it generated an atmosphere in
which formal legal claims were regarded as unfriendly behavior. Therefore, it corresponds in the
model to a very high international political cost for a complaint during this decade.
In the 1970s, the GATT began to rebuild its legal system with the Tokyo Round negotiations.
The U.S. reversed its antilegalist position, and among other countries there was a gradual awakening
of interest in the dispute settlement system. Therefore, we can consider the political cost to have
gradually come down in this decade, to the level of the 1950s, and to have continued to decrease
throughout the 1980s after the Tokyo Round negotiations. The GATT dispute settlement procedure
became a popular and regular device for member countries to resolve trade disputes in this decade.
Although we also witnessed earlier that a higher fraction of panel reports was being blocked during
this decade, and therefore the expected benefits from the litigation procedure for the complainant
decreased, the decrease in political costs presumably exceeded the decrease in expected benefits so
that overall the relative political cost p˜ic decreased for a complaint during the 1980s.
5 Conclusion
This paper develops a unified theoretical model of the dispute settlement mechanism to explain the
stylized facts observed across different decades of the GATT/WTO regimes. At the panel stage, it
first investigates the benefits and costs that disputants might have faced when they decided to block
an adverse panel ruling under the GATT, and how the new appellate procedure under the WTO
has altered the disputants’ incentive to challenge a panel ruling. The model explains the surge in
blocking incidence during the 1980s over the preceding GATT years and the immense frequency
at which the new appellate procedure under the WTO is invoked. At the consultation stage, this
paper then studies the effects of political power on countries’ incentives to use, and interactions
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in using, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement mechanism. It is shown that the magnitude of the
political cost, relative to the potential benefit that the complainant stands to gain when using
this mechanism, determines the pattern of filing activity and the frequency of various procedural
outcomes. This result, when confronted with the statistics on disputes in different decades of the
GATT regime, provides an indicator of how well the dispute procedure has worked during various
decades, in terms of how much this procedure has been subject to potential power politics.
Appendix
Equilibrium “FP2”: 0 < p˜ic < δ, p˜ic ≤ piec, E∆W fc (piec) = 0, p˜ic + piec < 1
Use equations (7) and (8). The condition p˜ic + pi
e
c < 1 implies that pi
e will be less 1 for all possible types of D.
For pid ∈ [piec − p˜ic, 1], pie > max{piec, p˜ic} = piec. Therefore, D will offer to settle at Se, which pic ∈ [piec, pie] will accept,
and pic ∈ [pie, 1] will reject and proceed to the panel. On the other hand, for all pid ∈ [0, piec − p˜ic], D will not settle, in
which case, pic ∈ [piec, 1] will go on to the panel procedure. These outcomes are illustrated in panel “FP2” of Figure 4.
To derive the condition on p˜ic under which such an equilibrium will arise, note that for pic = pi
e
c, the expected
payoff from filing is
E∆W fc (pi
e
c) = (pi
e
c − p˜ic)E∆W pc +
∫ 1
piec−p˜ic
∆W sc dpid
= (piec − p˜ic)(
δ2βV
1− δ pi
e
c −
1
1− δK
f ) +
∫ 1
piec−p˜ic
(Se −Kf ) dpid.
Using the formula for Se from equation (7) again, we can show that E∆W fc (pi
e
c) =
1
4
δβV
1−δ [δpi
e
c
2+2δ(1− p˜ic)piec+ δp˜i2c +
(2δ− 4)p˜ic+ δ]. The condition that E∆W fc (piec) = 0 implies that piec = p˜ic+2
√
1−δ
δ
√
p˜ic− 1. As the conditions on this
equilibrium suggest, piec has to be bigger than p˜ic and such that p˜ic+pi
e
c < 1. These conditions translate correspondingly
into the conditions on p˜ic. They are: (a) p˜ic ≤ piec ⇒ p˜ic ≥ δ4(1−δ) ; (b) piec + p˜ic < 1 ⇒ p˜ic < 1+δ2δ −
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ
.
Equilibrium “FP3”: 0 < p˜ic < δ, p˜ic ≤ piec, E∆W fc (piec) = 0, p˜ic + piec ≥ 1
Use D’s settlement decision equations (7) and (8) again. In this scenario, p˜ic + pi
e
c ≥ 1 so that when pie = 1,
pid = 2 − p˜ic − piec is no bigger than 1. For all pid ∈ [piec − p˜ic, 2− p˜ic − piec], pie > max{piec, p˜ic} = piec. Therefore, D will
offer to settle at Se, which pic ∈ [piec, pie] will accept, and pic ∈ [pie, 1] will reject and proceed to the panel. For all
pid ∈ [2− p˜ic − piec, 1], D will offer to settle at the upper bound pie = 1, which all pic ∈ [piec, 1] will accept. At last, for
all pid ∈ [0, piec − p˜ic], D will not settle, in which case, pic ∈ [piec, 1] will go on to the panel procedure. These outcomes
are illustrated in panel “FP3” of Figure 4.
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Note that in this equilibrium, for pic = pi
e
c, the expected payoff from filing is
E∆W fc (pi
e
c) =(pi
e
c − p˜ic)E∆W pc +
∫ 2−p˜ic−piec
piec−p˜ic
∆W sc dpid + (p˜ic + pi
e
c − 1)∆W sc |Se=(1−p˜ic) δ2βV1−δ
=(piec − p˜ic)(
δ2βV
1− δ pi
e
c −
1
1− δK
f ) +
∫ 2−p˜ic−piec
piec−p˜ic
(Se −Kf ) dpid + (p˜ic + piec − 1)[(1− p˜ic)
δ2βV
1− δ −K
f ].
We can use the formula of Se in equation (7) again to show that E∆W fc (pi
e
c) =
δβV
1−δ [δ(1 − p˜ic)piec − (1 − δ)p˜ic]. The
condition that E∆W fc (pi
e
c) = 0 implies that pi
e
c =
(1−δ)p˜ic
δ(1−p˜ic) . Using the conditions of this equilibrium on pi
e
c, we can derive
the corresponding conditions on p˜ic. They are: (a) p˜ic ≤ piec ⇒ p˜ic ≥ 2δ−1δ ; (b) piec + p˜ic ≥ 1 ⇒ p˜ic ≥ 1+δ2δ −
√
1+2δ−3δ2
2δ
.
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Table 1: Blocking/Appealing Incidence of Panel Reports under the GATT/WTO
Regimes Pre-Tokyo Round Post-Tokyo Round WTO
Decades 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1995–2000
Total Rulings 21 5 15 47 46
(No Violation) (6) (0) (7) (7)
(Violation) (15) (5) (8) (40)
(Blocked by C) (0) (0) (0) (2)
(Blocked by D) (1) (0) (0) (8)
Blocked/Appealed 1 0 0 10 36
Percentage of Total Rulings 5% 0% 0% 21% 78%
Note 1: For the GATT era, the data on “Total Rulings” and outcomes of rulings, “No Violation/Violation,” were
compiled from Hudec (1993, p. 289).
Note 2: For the GATT era, the blocked cases were identified from the Database of Hudec (1993) as follows. Cases
with “Procedure” entry of “4” AND “Plenary Action” entry of “1.2”, “1.8”, or “2.3” were first selected
from Database Part II (pp. 588–608). Among them, whose panel reports were actually blocked were then
identified using the information in Database Part I (pp. 417–585). The identified cases are Complaints
42, 103, 105, 107, 113, 132, 137, 149, 185, 191, 196.
Note 3: The DISC case and its three counter-claims (Complaints 69–72, filed in 1973) were not included in the
blocked cases. Their panel rulings were blocked at first but eventually the Council were able to reach
decisions in 1982.
Note 4: The data on the WTO era were taken from Park and Umbricht (2001). Their number on “Total Rulings”
here excluded some panel reports whose time for appeal had not run out and some other panel reports
for reasons specified therein.
Table 2: Procedural Outcomes of Complaints Filed under the GATT and WTO
Regimes Pre-Tokyo Round Post-Tokyo Round WTO
Decades 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1995–2000
Total Complaints 53 7 32 115 219
Cases in Progress 116
Rulings 21(40%) 5(71%) 15(47%) 47 (41%) 55 (53%)
Settled 22(42%) 2(29%) 12(38%) 28 (24%) 35 (34%)
Withdrawn or Abandoned 10(19%) 0 ( 0%) 5 (16%) 40 (35%) 13 (13%)
Note 1: The data were compiled from Hudec (1993, p. 287) and Park and Umbricht (2001) for complaints filed
under the GATT and the WTO regimes, respectively.
Note 2: The percentages in brackets refer to the frequency of a certain procedural outcome with respect to total
complaints (which are completed).
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Table 3: Overall Complaints v.s. Complaints Invoking MTN Codes During the 1980’s
Procedural Outcomes Overall MTN Codes Blocking Incidence Overall MTN Codes
Total Complaints 115 35 Total Rulings 47 12
Rulings 47 (41%) 12 (34%) (No Violation) (7) (2)
Settled 28 (24%) 8 (23%) (Violation) (40) (10)
Withdrawn/Abandoned 40 (35%) 15 (43%) (Blocked by C) (2) (2)
(Blocked by D) (8) (5)
Blocked 10 7
% of Total Rulings 21% 58%
Note 1: The data on “Overall” complaints during the 1980’s were compiled from Hudec (1993) as explained in
the notes to Table 1 and Table 2.
Note 2: The data on “MTN Codes” complaints were identified from the Database Part II (pp. 588-608) of
Hudec (1993) as follows. The cases invoking “MTN Codes” were identified by the column “Legal Provi-
sions”. They are Complaints 97, 99, 103, 105, 106, 109, 111, 114, 115, 121, 123, 126, 128, 130, 134, 136,
137, 142, 147, 149, 151, 158, 159, 164, 165, 185, 188, 190, 191, 192, 196, 197, 203, 204, 205. Their pro-
cedural outcomes were then identified using the following method. Cases with “Procedure” entry of “4”
OR “Plenary Action” entry of “3” were identified as cases with “Rulings”; cases with “Plenary Action”
entry of “1” BUT NOT “Procedure” entry of “4” were identified as cases “Withdrawn/Abandoned”; the
remainder were cases “Settled”. This classification was verified to reach the same aggregate number of
procedural outcomes for overall complaints as reported by Hudec (1993).
Note 3: Blocked cases which invoked “MTN Codes” could be easily identified by comparing the list of blocked
cases (note 2 to Table 1) and the list of “MTN Codes” cases (note 2 above). They are Complaints 103,
105, 137, 149, 185, 191, 196.
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Figure 1: Game Tree of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure
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Figure 2: Incentives and Frequencies of Complainants and Defendants to Block/Appeal a Panel
Report
pdf
GATT
f (L| 1) f ’ (L| 1)
K (L)b
V
1- δ
0 L 1
L
cost & benefit to D of blocking a "violation" ruling 
L
0
pdf
f (L| 0) f ’ (L| 0)
K (L)b
L
0 L 1
L0
cost & (zero) benefit to C of blocking a "no violation" ruling
f (L| 0)
pdf
L
1- 
V
δ
δ
1- δ V
δ
0 1
L
L0
cost & benefit to C of appealing a "no violation" ruling
f (L| 1)
pdf
WTO
L
0 1
L
V + L
1- δ V
δ
V
1- δ
V
cost & benefit to D of appealing a "violation" ruling
35
Figure 3: Defendant’s Settlement Decision
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Outcomes as p˜ic Varies ( p˜ic < δ )
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Figure 5: Parameter Space and Corresponding Equilibrium
(2/3 , 1/2)
δ
δ
2-
-
δ2 1−
δ
δ2 δ2-
1+2δ -3 δ 21+ δ
δ4(1- )
δ
δ2 -1
δ
∼
cpi
0.6 0.80.40.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
δ
FW2
FW1
FW3
FW2
FW1
FP2
NF
NF
10
NF NF
δ
FP3
FP1
FP3
FP1
38
